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NOTES AND COMMENTS
While public policy should protect the freedom of debate and
expression of opinion on the merits of the case in order that the
evidence may be thoroughly considered, 5 such policy does not re-
quire the protection of a juror who gives additional evidence as in
the case of In re Nunns.6 Although Mr. Wigmore contends that no
such limitation should be placed upon privileged communications,"
it would seem to be the better rule that statements of personal knowl-
edge, which should be given by the juror as a witness in open court
under oath and upon cross-examination, should not be privileged.
Therefore, it is believed that it would be more desirable to adopt a
middle view, namely, that only certain communications should be
privileged.
In the principal case the Circuit Court of Appeals,8 though ad-
mitting that there was authority contra, was content to say that such
communications should not be privileged. The Supreme Court
did not deny that such a privilege existed or that the communica-
tions were those that should be protected, but held that since the de-
fendant had fraudulently entered into the relation giving rise to the
privilege she was not entitled to the protection of that privilege. It
was thought that the policy of protecting jurors from disclosure of
the course of their deliberations was outweighed by the necessity
of preserving the jury from corrupting influences, and this view
is believed to be sound.
JULE MCMICHAEL.
Negligene--Duty of Guest in Automobile.
Plaintiff was the guest of the defendant in the rear seat of the
latter's automobile. Although the plaintiff was aware that the night
was foggy and the road narrow and winding, she did not protest the
defendant's maintenance of a dangerous rate of speed. Defendant
lost control of the car, which went over an embankment, and the
plaintiff was injured. Held: No recovery; an automobile guest, fail-
ing to protest the driver's action in encountering possible danger,
reasonably apparent to both, is guilty of contributory negligence.'
5 In the case of In re Cochran, supra note 3, 143 N. E. at 213, the court
said: "It is not alone as to the final result-the verdict-that they are pro-
tected. Public policy requires that they be given the uttermost freedom of
debate as it requires in the case of the Legislature."
'Supra note 3.
'WIGMORE, "viDExvFc §2354 (b); ef. In re Cochran, supra note 3.861 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
'Adams v. Hutchinson, 167 S. E. 135 (W. Va. 1932).
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It is now well settled that such contributory negligence on the
part of a gratuitous passenger or guest is not the negligence of the
driver imputed to the guest, where the latter has no control over the
car or driver,2 but the independent negligence of the guest arising
from his duty to take some precaution for his own safety.8 The
weight of authority is to the effect that both driver and guest must
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, 4 although the
guest is usually held to a lesser degree of care than the driver.5 Au-
thority is somewhat at variance, however, as to what conduct should
be required of the guest in order to fulfill his duty. New York im-
poses on the guest a duty to keep as strict a lookout for danger as
the driver.6 Wisconsin requires the guest to keep a proper lookout,
holding, however, that what constitutes such a lookout depends upon
the circumstances of the case, and that the guest is not held to the
same degree of care in this respect as the driver.7 Connecticut holds
that a guest on the rear seat has no duty to keep a lookout.8 What-
ever may be the duty of the guest to maintain a watch so as to dis-
cover danger, he is generally required to warn the driver of obvious
danger,9 unless the driver apparently is cognizant of the peril and
'Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 130 S. E. 5 (1925); Nash v. Seaboard
Air Line R. Co., 202 N. C. 30, 161 S. E. 857 (1932); Charnock v. Reusing
Lighting and Refrigerating Co., 202 N. C. 105, 161 S. E. 707 (1932) ; 2 R. C.
L. 1207.
'Blanchard v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 116 Me. 179, 100 Atl. 666 (1917);
Schroeder v. Public Service Ry. Co., 118 Atl. 337 (N. J. 1921); Howe v.
Corey, 172 Wis. 537, 179 N. W. 791 (1920); HurDDY, AUTOMOBILES (8th ed.
1927) 974.
"Quierolo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 114 Cal. 610, 300 Pac. 487 (1931);
Round v. Pike, 102 Vt. 324, 148 Atl. 283 (1930) ; Grifenhan v. Chicago Rys.
Co., 299 Ill. 590, 132 N. E. 790 (1921).
Hoen v. Haines, 85 N. H. 36, 154 Atl. 129 (1931) ; Clarke v. Connecticut
Co., 83 Conn. 219, 76 AtI. 523 (1910).
eRead v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 219 N. Y. 660, 114 N. E. 1081 (1915)
(guest held contributorily negligent for failure to look out at grade cross-
ing); Noakes v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 195 N. Y. 543, 88 N. E. 1126
(1909) (failure to look out at grade crossing).
'Krause v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 217 N. W. 290 (1928) (guest riding with
collar over face to keep out night air held not contributorily negligent in
failing to see obstruction in road) ; Glick v. Baer, 186 Wis. 268, 201'N. W.
752 (1925) (guest found contributorily negligent in not seeing obstruction
in road).8Weidlich v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 93 Conn. 438, 106 Atl. 323 (1919)
(guest not contributorily negligent for failure to look out at grade crossing).
'Tenn. Cent. R. Co. v. Vanhoy, 143 Tenn. 312, 226 S. W. 225 (1920)
(guest held contributorily negligent in not warning driver of approach of
train); Hill v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 271 Pa. 232, 114 Ati. 634
(1921) (guest contributorily negligent in failing to warn driver of obvious
danger from street car).
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striving to avoid it,1° and to protest the driver's negligent or unlaw-
ful acts.11 However, there are two views even as regards these
duties: (1) Some courts hold that they are absolute duties on the
guest's part and that failure to warn or protest is contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law.12 The principal case represents an appli-
cation of this strict rule. (2) The other view prevailing is that
whether a guest by failing to warn or protest is wanting in due car
is a question for the jury.'3 This view shows a realization of the
fact that in many instances the highest degree of care may be silence
and inaction.14
There also may be a duty on the guest to request the driver to
stop the car and allow him to get out, if his warning or protest goes
unheeded, but this generally depends upon the circumstances.' 5 The
guest assumes the risk arising from defects in the vehicle known to
him.16 If he knows that the driver is incompetent, due to inexperi-
ence' 7 or intoxication, 18 he may be contributorily negligent in con-
tinuing to ride with him.
Although the result in the present case is probably correct, the
court, in attempting to establish a fixed rule of law to which every
guest must conform, is taking a decided step away from the present
trend toward the application of the general rules of negligence in
such cases. The impracticability of inflexible rules of conduct in
these cases, where there is such variability of pertinent facts, is ob-
'Schlossstein v. Bernstein, 293 Pa. 245, 142 At. 325 (1928); Smith v.
A. & Y. R. Co., 200 N. C. 177, 156 S. E. 508 (1931).
'Renner v. Tone, 273 Pa. 10, 116 Ati. 512 (1922) (driving on wrong
side of road) ; Joyce v. Brockett, 237 N. Y. 561, 143 N. E. 743 (1923) (driver
maintaining excessive speed); Martin v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 265 Pa. 282,
108 Atl. 631 (1915) (driver's failure to observe stop, look and listen law).
" Herold v. Clendenin, 161 S. E. 21 (W. Va. 1931) ; Clise v. Prunty, 108 W.
Va. 637, 152 S. E. 201 (1930); Hardie v. Barrett, 257 Pa. 42, 101 Atl. 75,
L. R. A. 1917F, 444 (1917) ; Renner v. Tone, supra note 11 at 514.
"Curran v. Anthony, 77 Cal. 462, 247 Pac. 236 (1926) ; Codner v. Stowe,
201 Iowa 800, 208 N. W. 330 (1926) ; Lawrason v. Richards, 129 So. 250 (La.
1930) ; Quierolo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 4 at 489; Nelson v.
Nygren, 181 N. E. 52 (N. Y. 1932) (guest went to sleep with knowledge and
consent of driver), noted in (1933) 31 MIcH. L. Rxv. 717.4 See Herman v. R. I. Co., 36 R. L 447, 90 Atl. 813, 814 (1920).
"Clark v. Traver, 237 N. Y. 544, 143 N. E. 736 (1923) ; King v. Pope,
202 N. C. 554, 163 S. E. 447 (1932); Chambers v. Hawkins, 233 Ky. 211,
25 S. W. (2d) 363 (1930).
O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525 (1921) ; Clise v. Prunty,
supra note 12 at 202.
Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267, 51 A. L. R. 576 (1926).
"Lynn v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 112, 148 Pac. 927, L. R. A. 1915E, 588; Way-
son v. Ranier Taxi Co., 136 Wash. 274, 239 Pac. 559 (1925); Schwartz v.
Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280 S. W. 32, 47 A. L. R. 323 (1926).
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vious. The trend toward consideration of all of the circumstances
seems decidedly the more rational view.
J. A. KLmE EMIR, JR.
Parent and Child-Suit by Child Against Parent Carrying
Liability Insurance.
I An unemancipated minor sues her father to recover for injuries
alleged to have been sustained while riding in a school bus owned by
the father and operated by him under a contract with the school
board. The action is one of assumpsit and is based upon the theory
that the father breached his contract with the board to use due care
in transporting pupils. Both the father and the board carry liability
insurance. Held: A directed verdict for defendant reversed; plain-
tiff may maintain the action. Since the defendant is protected by
insurance in his vocational capacity, the action is not an unfriendly
one and family harmony will not be disrupted.'
Authorities are not in agreement as to the common law rule re-
garding suits by minors against their parents for torts.2  This un-
certainty arises from the fact that no case involving the point has
ever beei litigated in England. 3 The first decision in this country
appeared in 1891. 4 The problem has been before the courts several
times since that date. 5 With striking uniformity courts of the United
'Lusk v. Lusk, 166 S. E. 538 (W. Va. 1932). Noted in (1933) Dt=a
BAR Ass. J. 51.
2 Those who contend that such suits were not allowable rely on the total
absence of cases involving the point, as showing the general understanding
of minors' rights in this respect Furthermore, they say, the very idea of
such a recovery was repugnant to the sanctity and harmony of the English
family. Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, 138 Misc. Rep. 485, 246 N. Y. Supp. 565
(1931) ; Damiano v. Damiano, 143 Atl. 3 (N. J. 1928) ; Belleson v. Skilbeck,
185 Minn. 537, 242 N. W. 1 (1932). Others, quoting from old English text
writers to the effect that a minor could sue his father for a malicious injury,
assert that this demonstrates the state of the English mind with regard to
infants' rights. They also take the view that it is wholly unreasonable to as-
sume from a lack of decisions that the remedy would have been denied had
a proper case been presented. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Ati. 905
(1930), 71 A. L. R. 1055 (1931), citing 2 AiDisoN, ToRTs (4th ed.) 727;
CLM AND LiNDsALL, TORTS (8th ed.) 199; POLLOCK, TORTS (12th ed.) 128.
Note (1930) 79 U.-or PA. L. Rrv. 80.
I1 ScxouLmE, TnE LAw OF DomEsTic RmATioxs (6th ed. 1921) 718, n. 49;
Note (1923) 23 COL. L. Rxv. 686.4 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), 13 L. R. A. 682
(1891) ; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1929) 43
HARv. L. Ray. 1030, 1082.
5For a good review of the cases see Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118
S. E. 12 (1923), 31 A. L. L 1135 (1924). Note (1923) 30 COL. L. REV. 686;
(1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030 (a most careful and comprehensive study of
